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THE TAXATION ON DEATH OF ANNUITIES
AND OTHER INTERESTS
H. L. E. WmTE'
"Whenever property changes hands on death, the state is entitled
to step in and take toll [of the property of the deceased] ."
The words quoted above are those of Lord Justice MacNaghten
in Earl Cowley v. Inland Revenue Commissioners' and were made in
reference to the Finance Act (U.K.) 1894.2 These words set the guide-
lines and indicate the basis on which death taxes are levied, not only
in the United Kingdom, but also in Canada.
The revenue statutes do not, at present, tax all property which
changes hands on the death of the deceased. It is thus the function
of the statute which imposes death taxes to set out, with particu-
larity, what property is, and what property is not, liable to be caught
in the revenue net. It is in the area of defining property taxable on
death that difficulties have appeared. It is thus not surprising to find
that much of the case law relating to death taxation has been con-
cerned with the definitive sections of the relevant statutes.
This study is written for the purpose of examining the problems
(and the solutions which have been devised for them) which have
arisen in relation to the taxation of one particular type of property,
namely "annuities" and "other interests" which pass on death and
which have been purchased or provided by the deceased. In order to
discuss these problems with any degree of clarity it will be necessary
to refer to various decisions of the Courts on the subject, both in the
United Kingdom and Canada. On the basis of such an analysis, it is
the writer's hope that some light will be shed on the subject and
perhaps the reader will then be able to determine those instances in
which "annuities" and "other interests" will be subject to taxation on
death in the future.
* Mr. White is a graduate of the University of Toronto and Osgoode Hall
Law School and is currently articling with the firm of McMillan, Binch,
Stuart, Berry, Dunn, Corrigan and Howland. The writer wishes to acknow-
ledge the assistance and guidance of D. I. Matheson, of the above firm, in
the preparation of this article.
1 [18991 A.C. 198 at 210.
2 57-58 Vict. c. 30. This is the British precursor of our Estate Tax Act.
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Annuities and other interests are taxable under both the Ontario
Succession Duty Act3 and the Estate Tax Act.4 It would perhaps be
convenient to set out, at this point, the relevant provisions of these
Acts.
Section 1(p) (ii) of the Ontario Succession Duty Act provides:
In this Act, property passing on the death of the deceased is deemed to
include . . . any annuity, income or other interest purchased or in any
manner provided by the deceased either by himself alone or in concert
or by arrangement with any other person to the extent of the interest
therein accruing or arising on the death of the deceased.
The parallel provision of the Estate Tax Act, section 3(1) (j),
provides that:
There shall be included in computing the aggregate net value of the
property passing on the death of a person the value of all property
wherever situated, passing on the death of such person, including, with-
out restricting the generality of the foregoing, any annuity or other
interest purchased or provided by the deceased, either by himself alone
or in concert or by arrangement with any other person, to the extent of
the beneficial interest therein arising or accruing by survivorship or
otherwise on the death of the deceased.
The careful reader of these two sections will notice that while
the provisions are substantially the same, the terms of section 1(p)
(ii) would appear to be wider than those of section 3(1) (j) in that:
(1) the former taxes "income" specifically in contrast with the terms
of section 3(1) (j) which makes no reference to the word; and (2)
the terms of section 1(p) (ii) tax property "to the extent of the
interest arising or accruing", whereas section 3 (1) (j) is restricted to
the "beneficial interest arising or accruing".
Jameson, in his text, Ontario Succession Duties, remarks on the
latter distinction as follows:
The [Succession Duty] Act does not include the word 'beneficial' but it
is our view that this does not detract from the meaning of the sub-
section.5
It is submitted that, far from detracting from the meaning of
the sub-section, the terms of section 1(p) (ii) express the meaning
and purpose of the legislature with greater exactness and clarity than
does section 3(1) (j) which must be read in the light of judicial inter-
pretation of the section.
Before any comment may be made on the judicial interpretation
of these sections, the terms of section 2(1) (d) of the Finance Act
(U.K.) 1894,6 which served as a model for both the Ontario and
Federal provisions, should also be set out:
3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 386. Annuities and other interests are taxed at death on
the same principles in the provinces of British Columbia and Quebec as well.
4 S.C. 7 Eliz. II c. 29 as amended.
5 M. B. Jameson, Ontario Succession Duties (1959), p. 52.
6 Supra, footnote 2.
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Property passing on the death of the deceased shall be deemed to include
the property following, that is to say:-
any annuity or other interest purchased or provided by the deceased
alone or in concert or by arrangement with any other person to the
extent of the beneficial interest arising or accruing by survivorshlp
or otherwise on the death of the deceased.
Reference is made to this particular section, which is the same in
effect as section 3 (i) (j) of the Estate Tax Act, because much of the
case law which will be discussed in this paper is British in origin.
It will now be in order to determine the meaning and application
of these provisions. Lord Chancellor Loreburn, stated in a frequently
quoted passage in the case of Lethbridge v. Attorney-GeneraV with
reference to section 2 (1) (d) that:
The general purpose of this sub-section is to prevent a man escaping
estate duty by subtracting from his means, during life, moneys or money's
worth, which, when he dies, are to reappear in the form of a beneficial
interest accruing or arising on his death.
The present Ontario Succession Duty Act and the Estate Tax Act
have other provisions performing the same function, i.e. those sec-
tions which specifically tax insurance proceeds. These sections are
discussed briefly at a later point in this study.
In the leading case of D'Avigdor-Goldsmid v. I.R.C.,8 Lord Mor-
ton indicated in the course of his judgment that three conditions must
be satisfied before the terms of s. 2 (1) (d) would be applicable:
(i) There must be an annuity or 'other interest'; (ii) It must have been
purchased or provided by the deceased, either by himself alone or In
concert or by arrangement with any other person; and (iii) A beneficial
interest therein must accrue or arise by survivorship or otherwise on the
death of the deceased.9
To determine the meaning of these sub-sections, it is proposed
that each of the requirements set out by Lord Morton be considered
separately in conjunction with the applicable case law.
The first requirement is that "there must be an annuity or other
interest" in the property subject to taxation. The first problem, then,
would appear to be to determine what an "annuity" is. Briefly, an
annuity is
a yearly payment of a certain sum of money granted to another in fee,
or for life, or for a term of years, either payable under a personal obliga-
tion of the grantor or charged upon his pure personalty, although It may
be made a charge upon his freehold or leasehold land .... 10
In addition, it should be noted that an annuity may be a charge
on the corpus of an estate and, if it is, the annuitant may, if the
income is insufficient, require a sale of a sufficient part of the corpus
to keep up the value of the annuity. Further, an annuity may be
created by will and if it is so created, it commences, unless otherwise
7 [1907] A.C. 19 at 22.
8 [1953] A.C. 347; [1953] 1 All E.R. 403.
9 [1953] A.C. 347 at 366.
10 Earl Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law (1959).
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provided, from the death of the testator," and, unless otherwise
directed, the first payment is to be made one year after the testator's
death.12
The second problem is to ascertain the meaning of the phrase
"or other interest" as it is used within the context of the sub-sections
under consideration. According to the Canadian Estate and Gift Tax
Reporter:
The words 'or other interest' are extremely wide, and under the corre-
sponding English legislation ... those words have been considered wide
enough to cover insurance.13
The authorities cited for this statement include the cases of Re Gass-
ton14 and Re MacPhayden.15 However, it should be noted that insur-
ance proceeds payable on the death of the deceased will not always
be taxable under the terms of sections 1(p) (ii) and 3(1) (j).16
In the Manitoba case of Re Gasston, a decision of Mr. Justice
Dysart, the facts were that an accident insurance policy in favour of
the insured's wife had been taken out by his employer who had paid
all the premiums on the policy. The insured had taken no real part in
arranging for the policy, and the payment of the premiums by the
employer in no way affected the remuneration of the employee. The
insured died as a result of an aircraft accident while on his employer's
business and the insured's wife, as beneficiary, received the proceeds
of the policy. One of the issues before the Court was whether such
proceeds were taxable under s. 3 (g) of the Manitoba Succession Duty
Act which corresponds with section 3 (1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act.
The learned judge, after examining the relevant decisions of the
British Courts held:
These high authorities all held that life insurance policies-or moneys
payable under them to a donee or beneficiary-fall within the expression'interest' and is taxable as property passing on the death of the insured.1 7
However, since the policy in this case was not purchased or provided
by the deceased, by himself or in conjunction with others, all the
conditions of the sub-section (noted supra) were not met, with the
result that the proceeds were not taxable.
Mr. Justice Dysart refused to accept the argument that the rule
of ejusdem generis applied in interpreting the phrase "other interest",
on the basis of the British cases considered by him. Thus, the effect
of the Re Gasston decision was to extend the scope of the phrase
"other interest" to cover not only life insurance policies but also
accident insurance policies which matured on the death of the insured
11 Re Robbins, [19071 2 Ch. 13.
12 Houghton v. Franklin (1826), 1 Sim. & S. 390.
13 C.C.H. Canadian Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, para. 896.
14 [19431 2 D.L.R. 220.
15 [19441 1 D.L.R. 542; aff'd on appeal [1944] 2 D.L.R. 143.
16 See D'Avigdor-Goldsmid v. I.R.C., discussed infra.
17 [1943] 2 D.L.R. 220 at 223.
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provided that they were purchased or provided by the deceased and
a beneficial interest therein accrued or arose at death.
The Ontario case of Re MacPhayden decided by Mr. Justice Hope
and affirmed on appeal followed the decision in the Gasston case, both
in time and in principle. The issue before the Ontario Court was
whether or not the proceeds of an accident insurance policy on the
life of the deceased were taxable under the terms of section 8 (2) (e)
of the Ontario Succession Duty Act. Section 8 (2) (e) of the Act, at
that time, was expressed in the same terms as the present section
3(1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act. In this case, the premiums on the
policy had been paid by the deceased who was subsequently killed
in an accident.
Mr. Justice Hope held that the proceeds of the policy were tax-
able since they constituted an "other interest" within the terms of
section 8(2) (e). In the course of his judgment, his Lordship quoted18
with approval the following excerpt from the judgment of Chief Baron
Palles in the case of Attorney-GeneraZ v. Robinson: 19
'Interest' here must plainly mean interest in property .... The thing
subjected to taxation is 'the beneficial interest accruing or arising by
survivorship or otherwise, on the death of the deceased, in any annuity
or in any other interest in property purchased or provided by the de-
ceased' as mentioned in the section. The words 'accruing or arising' are
used in contradistinction to 'passing'. They indicate, not the transfer
upon death to another of something which the deceased or some other
person had before or at the death, but the springing up, upon the death,
and the then vesting in another, of property which previously had not
been existing in any one. This is an exact description of money secured
by a policy of insurance.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it would thus appear that
the term "other interest" as found in sections 1 (p) (ii) of the Succes-
sion Duty Act and 3(1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act will not be in-
terpreted subject to the rule of ejusdem generis which rule would
restrict its meaning, but will be interpreted as broadly as possible
in order to bring any interest in property, otherwise taxable under
the sections, within the reach of the Revenue net.
The second condition noted by Lord Morton in his judgment in
the D'Avigdor-GoZdsmid case is that the amount must have been
"purchased or provided by the deceased, either by himself alone or
in concert or by arrangement with any other person". The terms of
the condition would seem to imply that if the interest is purchased
or provided by a person other than the deceased and such other
person is not acting in concert or by arrangement with the deceased,
no tax will be exigible. In the case of Be Gasston (discussed supra)
the insurance proceeds escaped taxation because of such a state of
affairs.
In the earlier case of Attorney-General v. Murray,20 which in-
volved a marriage settlement, the Court of Appeal concluded that no
18 [1944] 1 D.L.R. 542 at 545.
19 [1901] 2 Ir. R. 67.
20 [1904] 1 K.B. 165.
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tax was payable under the terms of s. 2 (1) (d) of the U.K. Finance
Act on the basis of the same principle. The facts in this case were that
a father settled a fully-paid insurance policy in trust for his son's
wife for life at the time of the marriage of the son. On the death
of the son (his father having predeceased him) estate tax was claimed
on the insurance proceeds under the terms of section 2(1) (d). The
Court dismissed the claim because, although the son had known and
approved of the settlement, it could not be shown that he had pur-
chased or provided it, in concert or by arrangement with another.
In fact, the person who had purchased or provided it was the father.
In this case, however, the policy was void for want of an insurable
interest.
Jameson, in his text, Canadian Estate Tax,21 states:
The provision by the decedent must be a provision in fact, although it is
not necessary that it should be made direct. It is sufficient if the decedent
provides the means and sets the process in motion, but if he was repaid
or the payments he made, or where he paid the premiums due to an
agreement under which he received full consideration, no duty is payable.
The third condition, noted by Lord Morton, which must be ful-
filled before tax is payable under the terms of s. 3 (1) (j) of the Estate
Tax Act and s. 2(1) (d) of the U.K. Finance Act, 1894, is that "a
'beneficial' interest . . . [in the property] . . . must accrue or arise
by survivorship or otherwise on the death of the deceased." The
application of this third condition of taxability has given rise to some
of the most difficult problems in relation to the interpretation of the
concept embodied in these sections. If Jameson is correct in his
assertion that the omission of the word 'beneficial' from s. 1(p) (ii)
of the Ontario Succession Duty Act is not significant, and the decided
cases support this contention, then the following discussion is equally
applicable to that section.
The leading case relating to the problem of whether or not a
'beneficial interest' accrues or arises on the death of a person is the
House of Lords decision in D'Avigdor-Goldsmid v. I.R.C.22 The facts
of the case were that the deceased, on his marriage in 1907, made a
settlement in trust into which he brought an insurance policy together
with other property and he covenanted with the trustees to pay the
premiums on the policy annually. Later, in 1930, the settlement was
terminated and the property in it, including the insurance policy,
was r.e-settled on such trusts as the deceased and the plaintiff (who
was the deceased's son) should appoint and in default of appointment
on certain named trusts. In 1934, the deceased and the plaintiff
appointed that the policy, inter alia, should be held in trust for the
plaintiff absolutely and that the deceased would be released from
the payment of any further premiums on the policy. From 1934 until
the deceased's death in 1940, the plaintiff son paid the premiums on
this policy. After the settlor's death, the Crown sought to tax the
21 M. B. Jameson, Canadian Estate Tax (1960) p. 134.
22 Supra, footnote 8.
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policy under the terms of s. 2(1) (d) of the Finance Act but the
House of Lords unanimously dismissed the claim.
In the course of his judgment, Lord Parker stated:23
If it is accurate to say that the interest which is aimed at in s. 2(1) (d)
is the policy money when received and not the contract of insurance
represented by the policy, there does spring up for the first time on the
death of the assured an interest which, then and then only, arises or
accrues.... But, in my opinion... I cannot accept the view that some
fresh interest accrues or arises in the beneficial holder of a policy on the
death of the deceased life.
Lord Parker then stated that since the appellant had been the
absolute owner for some six years prior to the death, he did not get
a new interest in the policy at the time of death, he merely obtained
an increase in the value of the interest which he had received prior
to the death.
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone stated in his judgment in the same
case:
The 'beneficial interest' referred to in the concluding lines of the ma-
terial paragraph was a 'beneficial interest' in the 'other interest' re-
ferred to in its opening lines. It is a clumsy collocation of terms, no
doubt, but it must mean a beneficial interest in a contractual right to
exact LX if and when Sir Osmund (the father) should die... The death
has not generated a new beneficial interest. What it has done Is to
enhance the value of the 'other interest' in which the beneficial interest
subsisted.24
In short, no tax was exigible under s. 2(1) (d) in this case because
the son received no new interest in the policy. He had merely obtained
"the fruition of the (absolute) interest he already held, the quality
of the right remained unaltered"; and the death was merely the
time at which the right was realized.
In the later case of Re Barbour's Life Assurance Policies:
Wrightson et al v. I.l.C..,25 the House of Lords applied the principles
it had enunciated in the D'Avigdor-Goldsmid case. The facts in this
case were that the deceased settlor had irrevocably settled fully-paid
insurance policies on his own life in trust for certain beneficiaries for
life in 1932 and the settlor died some eighteen years later. The Crown
had claimed estate tax under s. 2 (1) (d) but their Lordships dismissed
the claim. The House of Lords held that the interest of beneficiaries
in such settled life policies was an interest in possession effective
from the date of settlement, and the right to receive the income
from the proceeds of the policies after the death of the settlor is not
a new right accruing to them by the event of death.
2 6
However, Jameson notes in his text, Canadian Estate Tax, that
the effect of these two decisions is merely to exclude insurance from
tax under these sections in instances where the beneficiary had
23 [1953) 1 All E.R. 403 at 407.
24 [1953) 1 All E.R. 403 at 417.
25 [1955) 3 All E.R. 41; [1956) 1 All E.R. 627; [1957) 2 All E.R. 745.
26 C.C.H. Canadian Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, para. 899.
[VOL. 3:362
1965] Taxation in Death of Annuities and other Interests
acquired an absolute and indefeasible right to the interest which was
purchased or provided by the decedent. If the interest was defeasible and
became indefeasible on the death, then there is a change of interest and
the section [3(1) (Q) of the Estate Tax Act] will apply. Similarly, if there
is a change of interest in respect of an interest contingent on the bene-
ficiary surviving the decedent.27
The author cites, inter alia, the case of Adamson v. Attorney-Gen-
eral28 as an authority for this statement. The case is well worth noting
since it led to an immediate revision of the statutory provisions in the
U.K. Finance Act.
The facts of the case were that the settlor established a trust
wherein he directed that the trustees apply the capital of the
trust fund for the benefit of his children living at the date of the
trust or any children born thereafter, as he should appoint. The trust
further provided that any income not so appointed should be applied
by the trustees during the settlor's life for the benefit of such children
as he should appoint. Any excess income was to be added to capital.
On his death, the income and capital not then distributed were to be
paid to his children as he should by deed or will appoint and there
were further provisions to take effect if no appointment was made.
The settlor died without making any appointment and leaving three
children who had been living at the date of the creation of the trust.
Their Lordships held that the provisions of section 2(1) (d)
applied because on the settlor's death, the children became entitled
to a share in the fund to which, before the settlor's death, they had
only held a beneficial interest in expectancy. The change of interest
was held to have arisen on death and to have been provided by the
deceased.
However, the Court further held (Lord Russell dissenting) that
the property was taxable only to the extent to which the principal
value of such beneficial interest upon the death of the settlor exceeded
the actual value of the expectant beneficial interest of each child
before the death of the settlor. This second conclusion was based on
the fact that the section only imposed tax "to the extent of the bene-
ficial interest therein arising or accruing on the death of the de-
ceased". The result of course would be to render the tax exigible
on a small portion of the property involved rather than on the whole
capital value of the trust at the time of death.
The defect in the legislation being thus made obvious, Parliament
reacted quickly and enacted s. 28 of the Finance Act of 1934. This
section had the effect of providing that the extent of any beneficial
interest accruing or arising on the death of the deceased and falling
within section 2 (1) (d)
... shall be ascertained, and shall be deemed always to have been ascer-
tainable, without regard to any interest in expectancy the beneficiary
may have had therein before the death.29
27 Op. cit. p. 136.
28 [1933] A.C. 257.
29 The terms of s. 3 (4a) of the Estate Tax Act which section was enacted
in 1962 are substantially the same as s. 28. See discussion infra.
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In the case of Re Parkes' Settlement Trusts Midland Bank et al v.
I.R.C.,30 the English Court of Appeal indicated that the beneficial
interest arising or accruing on the death of the person who purchased
or provided the property would not always be subject to tax under
the terms of section 2 (1) (d).
Here, the deceased had established an inter vivos trust, the terms
of which provided, inter alia, that each of his two daughters was en-
titled to the income of the trust until the settlor's death up to the
amount of £250 or half the income whichever was the lesser sum.
On his death, the daughters were to become entitled to an annuity
of £250 out of trust income or the capital, if necessary. Further, each
of the settlor's four children was entitled to the surplus income during
the settlor's life and each was, contingently on surviving him, entitled
to share the trust capital equally with the others, subject to the
annuities granted to the daughters. The settlor died and each of the
four children survived him.
The Court of Appeal indicated that the corpus of the trust was
taxable as a beneficial interest arising or accruing on death since
such interest clearly vested on the settlor's death within the terms
of section 2(1) (d). However, the Court held that the annuities to
the daughters were not taxable on the basis that there was no change
in the beneficial interest before and after death to justify tax being
exigible.
Lord Evershed, M.R., explained this aspect of the Court's de-
cision, thus:
There was, of course, this difference in the incidents of that right
during the settlor's life and after his death. During the former period,
the yearly sum was payable exclusively out of the income of each year
and was supported by no charge on capital and by no continuing charge
on income. After the settlor's death, the yearly sum was charged on the
corpus of the fund specially appropriated for the purpose; but in point
of beneficial enjoyment there was no essential difference in my judgment,
before and after the settlor's death .... 31
It is submitted, with all due respect to the learned judge, that
this line of reasoning is, in some respects, faulty. Although there was
no change in the "beneficial enjoyment" of the interest in the prop-
erty, there is a great difference in the "beneficial interest" held by
each daughter prior to and after the death of the settlor. The terms
of the section are designed to tax the difference in the rights of the
beneficiary in relation to the property and not the difference in the
enjoyment of the property.32
If the property, which was the subject of the trust in this case,
had produced no income whatsoever before the settlor's death, then
the "beneficial enjoyment" would be taxable, if one applies the same
30 [1956] 1 All E.R. 833.
31 Id. at 837.
32 See the judgment of Lord Asquith in the D'Avigdor-Goldsmid case
(discussed supra).
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reasoning as did Lord Evershed in this case. This, it is submitted, was
not the intention of the legislature nor can it be supported by the
plain meaning of the words in the section.
The most recent British case of importance in relation to the
problem of determining what is a "beneficial interest accruing or
arising on death" is the decision of the House of Lords in Parker et al
v. Lord Advocate (on behalf of Inland Revenue Commissioners).33 The
facts of the case were that, in 1938, the settlor established a trust fund
under which, during the lifetime of the settlor, the income was to
be paid to her three children and upon the settlor's death the trust
fund was to be divided into three equal shares and a share was to be
paid over to each of the children as an absolute share. Under the
applicable Scottish law, the children had no interest in the trust fund
itself until the settlor's death, at which time each child became en-
titled to one-third of the capital in the fund. The settlor died in 1956
and the Crown claimed tax on the whole of the fund under the terms
of s. 2 (1) (d) as extended by s. 28 of the Finance Act of 1934.34
The Court held that, since the right to income ended at the death
of the settlor and since the capital of the trust fund became absolutely
vested in the beneficiaries at the same time, the beneficial interest
that arose or accrued at the time of death extended to the principal
value of the capital of the trust fund at that time. In deciding the
case, their Lordships quoted with approval parts of the decision of the
Court of Appeal in the earlier case of Re Parkes' Settlement Trusts35
discussed supra.
The effect of the Parker decision would seem to be that if there is
any change in the interest held by the beneficiaries of an inter vivos
trust fund at the time of the death of the settlor, then the new interest
which is created at that time will be taxable without regard to any
previous rights held by the beneficiaries in such fund, if, in fact, such
rights as existed prior to the death of the settlor ceased at that time.
The D'Avigdor-Goldsmid case is distinguishable because in the
D'Avigdor case, the beneficiary had absolute control over the policy
to the extent that no further interest could be attached to it. In the
Parker case the beneficiaries, while they had an absolute right to
the income prior to the death, had no control over the capital of the
trust fund as a present interest until the time of death of the settlor.
In essence, the beneficiary in the D'Avigdor case could deal with the
policy as a present interest before the settlor's death, whereas the
beneficiaries in the Parker case could only deal with the capital of the
trust fund as an interest in expectancy until the time of the settlor's
death.
As was noted earlier in this study, s. 3 (4a) of the Estate Tax
Act, modelled upon s. 28 of the U.K. Finance Act, 1934, was enacted
33 [1960] 1 All E.R. 20.
34 Supra, footnote 2.
3S [1956] 1 All E.R. 833.
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in 1962. Shortly before this, the Exchequer Court of Canada per Mr.
Justice Kearney gave its decision in the case of the Bassett Estate v.
M.N.R. 36 which, in all likelihood, prompted the passage of s. 3 (4a).
The case involved s. 3 (1) (g) of the Dominion Succession Duty
Act.37 Since s. 3 (1) (g) is substantially the same as the present s. 3 (1)
(j) of the Estate Tax Act, the case is worth noting. Briefly, the facts
were that, in 1947, the deceased, who was president of a publishing
company, accepted an offer from the company of a pension for himself
for life, and after his death, an annuity for his wife for life, in lieu of a
regular salary. The Court found that the annuity had been provided
by the company rather than the deceased and was thus not taxable
under s. 3(1) (g). However the Court indicated, obiter, that if the
annuity had been provided by the deceased, the beneficial interest
arising or accruing on the death of the husband would have been the
value of the annuity subsequent to the husband's death minus the
value of the interest in expectancy prior to his death. It was to
prevent such an argument being applied in relation to s. 3(1) (j) of
the Estate Tax Act that s. 3 (4a) was enacted.
In concluding the analysis of the meaning and application of the
sections which presently tax annuities or other interests provided by
the deceased to the extent of the beneficial interest accruing or
arising on death, it is apparent that the Courts have interpreted both
"other interests" and "beneficial interest" very widely so as to give
the sections a broad area of application. It is submitted, however, that
by doing so, the Courts have robbed the statutory provisions of the
quality of preciseness which is essential for any definitive section
of a taxing statute. Under the present case law, it is submitted that a
"beneficial interest" which is taxable within the context of section
3(i) (j) includes the following:
(1) Any interest in property which comes into being at the death of the
person who purchased or provided it, no such interest having existed
in any other person previously (as in the case of insurance policies);
or
(2) Any interest in property (which property is itself a beneficial interest
in property) which changes hands on the death of the person who
purchased or provided it (as in the case of a different class of bene-
ficiaries becoming entitled to a right in relation to the corpus of a
trust on the death of the deceased who purchased or provided it);38
or
(3) Any interest in property held by the beneficiary before the death of
the deceased who purchased or provided it, which interest is changed
on the death of the person who purchased or provided it directly or
indirectly.3 9
At this point, in order to illustrate some of the difficulties in-
volved in applying s. 3 (1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act, it would perhaps
36 62 D.T.C. 1032.
37 R.S.C. 1952, c. 89. This Act has since been repealed.
38 Cf. Scott v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1937] A.C. 174; Burrell
v. Attorney-General, [1937] A.C. 286.
39 Parker v. Lord Advocate, [1960] 1 All E.R. 20; but see also the discus-
sion of Re Parkes' Settlement Trusts (supra).
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be convenient to consider the taxation of insurance proceeds under
this section.
At the present time, it is not readily apparent whether or not
the words "or other interest" will apply to insurance proceeds in view
of the fact that section 3 (1) (m) of the Estate Tax Act specifically
applies to insurance policies and taxes them on the basis of ownership
and control immediately prior to the death of the insured.
W. Ivan Linton, of the Department of National Revenue, stated
in A Review of the Estate Tax Act: 40
• . . there has been a certain amount of concern that perhaps this Act
imports into this section [3(1) (j) I some reference to insurance. We have
given this a good deal of thought, but it is our conclusion-at the mo-
ment, anyway-that 'other interest' in this section cannot be construed
as referring to any ordinary kind of insurance on the deceased's life and
this is for two reasons. One is that we now have in this Act very specific
provisions for taxing life insurance. They are provisions entirely different
from those in the corresponding British legislation, different not only in
wording but also in principle; and we do not think that even if we wanted
to we could use the words 'other interest' in () as imposing a tax in
conflict with the tax on insurance in 3(1) (m).
However, in a recent article in the Canadian Tax Journal,
41
Messrs. McIntosh and Patterson noted in reference to this problem
that there is, in their view, strong reason to suppose that s. 3 (1) (j)
could be used to tax insurance policies.
The argument against it [i.e. the fact that s. 3(1) (j) will tax insurance]
is that where there is a specific section of a statute which, so to speak,
competes with a general section, the specific section governs. However,
in our view, there is no competition between (j) and (m). Subsection
(m) catches certain types of life insurance, subsection (j) catches others.
It is submitted that this latter view is correct.
In support of this submission, the following example is offered
for consideration. If the insured establishes an irrevocable insurance
trust and the trustees apply for the insurance and pay the premiums
on the policy from funds provided by the settlor, the following estate
tax consequences would ensue. The terms of s. 3(1) (m) would not
apply to tax the proceeds at the time of death, since the policy was
not owned by the deceased nor was it under his control within the
terms of s. 3(5) of the Act, whether or not such proceeds were dis-
tributable on death. However, it is submitted that the terms of s. 3
(1) (j) would apply to tax the insurance as an "other interest" pur-
chased or provided by the deceased. 42
The next section of this paper will be devoted to an examination
of the ways and means in which annuities and "other interests" can
be disposed of free and clear of estate tax and succession duties. In
40 W. I. Linton, A Review of the Estate Tax Act, 1961 ed., Canadian Tax
Foundation at p. 4.
41 Don't Give Insurance-Give Money. McIntosh and Patterson. 1964. 10
Can. Tax Jour. at p. 187 et sep.
42 For a fuller discussion of this problem see The Report of the 1964
Conference, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 267, 282, 283 et seq.
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the article Don't Give Insurance-Give Money 43 the authors adopted
the following scheme to escape death taxes.
In the case where a husband wishes a minor child to receive a
death benefit from an insurance policy on the father's life, the follow-
ing steps could be taken. First, the wife should apply for the policy
and name the child as beneficiary.... Under the terms of s. 3 (1) (m)
and s. 3 (5) of the Estate Tax Act, the wife would thus be the policy
owner. Secondly, the husband could make annual gifts to the wife
of cash, which cash the wife is free to dispose of as she sees fit. The
authors note that even if the wife uses the cash to pay the premiums
on the policy, it could well be argued that it is the wife, and not the
husband, who provided the money to buy the "other interest" within
the terms of s. 3(1) (j). Further, if the minor child is irrevocably
named as beneficiary under the terms of section 157 of Part V (1962)
of the Insurance Act, it could be argued that no beneficial interest
arose on death, for, by the nature of the irrevocable appointment, the
beneficial interest arose at the time of the appointment. If either of
these arguments is successful, then, it would appear that the operation
of s. 3(1) (j) is precluded. The effect of the above procedure would
also effectively preclude the operation of section 1(p) (ii) of the
Ontario Succession Duty Act which relies on the premium-payment
test.
The gift tax consequences of this scheme must be examined as
well. For purposes of this study, it will be assumed that there are no
gift tax consequences involved in the annual gifts by the husband to
the wife. However, it should be noted that if nothing further is done
under the above scheme, the wife could well be assessed for gift tax
at the time of the maturity of the policy, on the basis that the amount
of the policy is a gift from the mother to the child.
This result can be avoided in two ways. The first method is to
have the mother sell the policy to the child when it reaches its
majority but this method runs the risk of the insured dying before
the child becomes of age.
The second, safer method, is to have the wife convey the policy
into a trust for the child during the insured's lifetime and then have
the wife pay the premiums through the trust. This would safely
prevent gift tax being applicable if the insured should die during the
child's minority.
The final problem to be discussed in this article is that relating
to the taxation of discretionary trusts under the terms of sections
3(1) (j) and 1(p) (ii) respectively. To illustrate this problem, the
following example is offered for consideration:
A settlor establishes an irrevocable inter vivos trust fund made
up of interest-bearing securities. The settlor directs, inter alia, in the
trust deed, that the income of the trust is to accumulate during his
43 Supra, footnote 41.
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lifetime and upon his death is to be distributed to named beneficiaries,
at the discretion of the trustees.
In this regard it is necessary to determine whether or not any
beneficial interest in the trust res accrued or arose on the settlor's
death. Although the right to income from a trust is a beneficial in-
terest44 in the trust, it would seem that, in the example, the right
to income would not arise or accrue on the death of the settlor; in
fact, the right to the income will not accrue or arise in the bene-
ficiaries until the trustee's discretion is exercised. Further, it would
appear that the right of the beneficiaries to the income from the
trust is not changed by the fact of the settlor's death. Prior to the
death, the beneficiaries would hold an interest in expectancy in re-
lation to the income and after the death, the interest remains an
interest in expectancy until the discretion of the trustees is exercised
in favour of the beneficiaries. Therefore, one would conclude that the
right to income would not be taxable as a beneficial interest in the
trust res arising or accruing on the death of the settlor.
However, what about the right of the beneficiaries to ask the
trustees to exercise their discretion in relation to the distribution
of the income of the trust? Is it subject to death tax under the terms
of the sections discussed?
This right was provided by the deceased and would thus be tax-
able if it is deemed to be an "other interest" within the terms of
section 3 (1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act, and section 1 (p) (ii) of the
Succession Duty Act respectively. On the basis of the decision of Mr.
Justice Dysart in Re Gasston (supra), it would seem that the term
"other interest", not being subject to the ejusdem generis rule, could
apply to any interest in property. The issue then would be to deter-
mine whether or not the right of the beneficiaries to ask the trustees
to exercise their discretion can be construed to be "property" within
the context of the Acts discussed.
In the Estate Tax Act, "property" is defined in section 58 (1) (o)
as follows:
'property' means property of every description whatever, whether real
or personal, movable or immovable, or corporeal or incorporeal and with-
out restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any estate or
interest in any such property, a right of any kind whatever, and a chose
in action;
It would appear that the right to ask the trustee to exercise his dis-
cretion in relation to the trust income is a "right of any kind what-
ever" and thus, one is forced to conclude that a right such as this may
well be taxable under the terms of the Estate Tax Act to the extent
of the beneficial interest therein arising or accruing on the death
of the settlor who provided it. Although the Ontario Succession Duty
Act has no parallel provision to s. 58 (1) (o) of the Estate Tax Act,
44 A.-G. v. Lloyd's Bank [1935] A.C. 382.
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it is likely that such a right might also be taxable under the terms
of the former statute.
The question which automatically follows from this submission,
is how can such a right be evaluated. It is submitted that the bene-
ficiary having such a right could borrow money on the security
of it. Surely this right would have some value to a lender, and it
would follow that the taxing authorities could base an assessment on
this value.
If the valuation of such a right becomes an issue before the
courts, the courts might well be required to consider how the trustees
intend to exercise their discretion. Generally speaking, the courts
will not exercise control over trustees in relation to trustees' dis-
cretionary powers.45 However, they may under certain circumstances
require that trustees exercise their discretion in favour of one or
more of the beneficiaries,46 e.g. in a situation where a discretionary
trust is established for the maintenance, benefit and education of
the beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries are in need of moneys for
educational purposes and have not received such moneys from the
trustees.
It is thus submitted that a right to ask trustees to exercise their
discretionary powers may be taxable as an interest in property arising
or accruing on the death of a person who provided such interest
within the terms of Section 3 (1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act and section
I (p) (ii) of the Ontario Succession Duty Act.
Having examined the problems and the application of the pro-
visions in the Canadian statutes which tax annuities and other in-
terests on death, it is submitted, in conclusion, that these provisions
could, if time permits, be re-examined by the Royal Commissions
which are presently studying tax legislation, both at the Ontario and
Federal level with a view to rendering their terms more precise. Any
amendments having this effect would be welcomed by every member
of the taxpaying public.
45 A. W. Scott, The Law of Trusts, 2nd ed., pp. 1374 et seq.
46 A. W. Scott, op cit, pp. 1389 et seq. See also Wilson v. Turner (1883),
22 Ch. D. 521.
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